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1 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court’s jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
(2009). 
 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 Issue #1: Did the trial court correctly award Petitioners’ title to the Property 
in question via a constructive trust? 
 Standard of review: Some discretion.  In highly fact dependant questions, such as 
this, the trial court is given some discretion in applying the law to a given set of facts.  
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).  “[I]n equity cases such as this is, 
this court may review the facts. However, it has long been established and reiterated by 
this court in numerous cases that due to the advantaged position of the trial court we will 
review its findings and judgments with considerable indulgence, and will not disagree 
with and upset them unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them, or the court 
has mistaken or misapplied the law applicable thereto.”  Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 
454 (Utah 1975). “We apply this standard of review in cases involving trusts which arise 
by operation of law . . . .”  In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982). 
Preservation for appeal: R. at 1053-54. 
 
 Issue #2: Did the trial court err in denying Petitioners’ request for attorneys’ 
fees under sections 75-3-719 and 75-1-310 of the Utah Code? 
 Standard of review:  Correctness.  “Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an 
action is a question of law, which we review for correctness.”  Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
Preservation for appeal: R. at 1057-58. 
3 
 
 Issue #3: Did the trial court err in granting Defendants’ motion for stay and 
other relief upon appeal under Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, despite 
Utah law stating that a stay and a supersedeas bond is not appropriate where, as 
here, there is a self-executing judgment? 
 Standard of review:  Correctness.  A court’s interpretation of a rule is a conclusion 
of law, which is reviewed for correctness.  See Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 
175, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 586. 
Preservation for appeal: Petitioners’ Opposition to Motion for Stay & Other 
Relief upon Appeal.1 
  
                                                 
1
 Filed on March 11, 2008.  This document was omitted from the 2nd Supplemental 
Judgment Roll and Index and therefore does not have a record citation. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 The following statutory provisions are materially relevant to this appeal, and a 
copy of each is attached in Addendum A: 
Statute of Limitation 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-307(1)(a). 
Probate Code: Intestate Estate 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-8-101(2)(b).   
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-102(1)(b).   
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-102(2).   
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-103(1). 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-206.   
Attorneys Fees 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-310. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719. 
 
 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 This case involves a dispute over a decedent’s property located at 2727 North 
Canyon Road, Provo, Utah (“the Property”).  The trial court properly awarded Petitioners 
the Property.  However, Petitioners appeal the trial court’s decision to not award them 
their attorneys’ fees and to grant Respondent a stay pending appeal. 
Procedural History 
In February 2005, Petitioners/Appellees filed a Petition to Set Aside Personal 
Representative’s Transfers from Decedent’s Estate.  (R. at 28-34.)  In October 2006, 
Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. at 511-619.)  Respondent’s motion 
was denied.  (R. at 801-02.)  A bench trial was then held on November 13-14, and 
December 6, 2007.  After the bench trial, the court awarded the Property to the Petitioners 
via a constructive trust.  (R. at 1178-79.)  The trial court awarded Petitioners their costs 
but declined to award them their attorneys’ fees.  (R. at 1180.)  Both Respondent and 
Petitioners filed notices of appeal.  In March 2008, Respondent filed a Motion for Stay 
and Other Relief Upon Appeal.  (R. at 1193-1201.)  The trial court granted Respondent a 
stay pending appeal.   Petitioners filed a second notice of appeal with respect to the stay. 
Statement of Facts2 
 Harold LeFevre (“Harold”) and his wife Edith had seven children (Petitioners Hal 
LeFevre, Julia Richmond, Jeffrey LeFevre, Kelly LeFevre, Daniel LeFevre, Bryce 
                                                 
2
 Because Respondent “is not directly challenging the trial court’s findings” of fact, these 
facts are taken largely from those findings of fact and are undisputed.  See Brief of 
Appellant, p. 7 n.38.  The findings of fact and conclusions of law are in Addendum B. 
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LeFevre and Cynthia Giles).  (R. at 1173.)  Harold and Edith owned the Property at 2727 
North Canyon Road, Provo, Utah as joint tenants.  Id.  Edith passed away in 1987.  Id.   
Harold had sole title to the Property after Edith’s death.  Id.   Harold later married Ellen 
Stout LeFevre (“Ellen”), who already had five children from a previous marriage (one of 
whom is Respondent Leland Stout) and who had her own home and property.  Id.  Harold 
and Ellen lived on the Property (Harold’s home and the Property at issue in this appeal) 
during their marriage.  Id.  On March 19, 1993, Harold died intestate. Id. 
 On March 24, 1993, after Harold’s funeral, Ellen called the seven LeFevre 
children together and admitted that she did not own the Property and asked them for 
permission to live on it.  (R. at 1173-74.)  Ellen and Petitioners verbally agreed that (a) 
Ellen would be allowed to stay on the Property until her death, and (b) that all of Ellen’s 
and Harold’s assets would be put into a trust to be distributed at Ellen’s death, with 
Harold’s estate going to his children and Ellen’s estate going to her children.  (R. at 
1174.)  Petitioners trusted Ellen and sought to maintain a good relationship with her.  Hal 
took Ellen on vacation with his family shortly after Harold’s death, and Bryce LeFevre 
continued to visit Ellen throughout the years.  (R. at 1174, 1175.)  Ellen’s attorney 
testified that all he observed was a good relationship between Ellen and Petitioners. (R. at 
1178.)  Ellen never indicated to Petitioners that she had changed her mind about the terms 
of the agreement.  (R. at 1176-77.)  In fact, Ellen reaffirmed to Bryce LeFevre in 2001 
that everything was set up according to their agreement.  (Transcript 11/13/2007, pp. 196-
98.) 
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On April 19, 1993, Ellen executed a will and the Ellen L. LeFevre Trust (“the 
trust”). (R. at 1174.)  The trust included the Petitioners as beneficiaries but split the trust 
estate between the two families without regard to specific divisions of particular assets. 
(R. at 1174-75.)  Ellen was the trustee.  On July 23, 1993, as the personal representative 
of Harold’s estate, Ellen transferred the Property into the trust. (R. at 1175.)  On June 13, 
1994, Ellen amended the trust and specifically divided the Property between Petitioners 
and her children.  Id.  On September 11, 1995, Respondent took Ellen to her attorney’s 
office where she amended the trust a second time.  Id. The second amendment took the 
Petitioners entirely out of the trust as beneficiaries. (R. at 1175-76.)  The Petitioners were 
never notified of these amendments or given copies of the trust documents, even though 
the new provisions violated the parties’ agreement.  Id. 
 Ellen passed away on October 28, 2004.  (R. at 1176.)  The Stouts did not notify 
Petitioners of her death, id., even though Respondent knew LeFevre children that lived a 
couple of blocks down the road. (Transcript 11/13/2007, p. 174.)  The Stout did not 
publish the obituary Ellen specifically prepared for publication upon her death. (R. at 
1176.)  In fact, the Stouts hurriedly buried Ellen without embalming her, had the house 
appraised, and were in the process of selling it to Respondent’s nephew when Petitioners 
learned of Ellen’s death.  (Transcript 11/13/2007, pp. 128-30, 172-74.)  The Stout 
children intended to disadvantage Petitioners by never making any effort to notify them of 
Ellen’s death and to exclude Petitioners from any participation in the distribution of 
Ellen’s estate.  (R. at 1177.)  Because of this, Petitioners did not discover that Ellen had 
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passed away until weeks after her death and did not become aware of Ellen’s breach until 
they discovered she had passed away, contacted her attorney, and received copies of the 
trust documents.  (R. at 1177-78.)  Immediately upon this discovery, on February 28, 
2005,3 Petitioners filed a Petition to Set Aside Personal Representative’s Transfers from 
Decedent’s Estate.  (R. at 28-34, 1178.)  In addition, the Petitioners requested that Hal 
LeFevre become the successor personal representative of Harold’s estate.  (R. at 61-72.) 
Petitioners are entitled to the Property via their agreement with Ellen and under the 
Utah probate code.  Harold’s probate estate is still open and before the courts.  The 
evidence at trial showed that Harold’s net intestate estate totaled $113,840.11.  (Trial 
Exhibit, Tab 96.)4  Since Ellen received $203,954.07 in nonprobate transfers, Petitioners 
are entitled to receive the entire intestate amount.  (Trial Exhibit, Tab 97.)  They filed 
their Petition in order to recover the Property wrongfully transferred away by Ellen and, 
in the alternative, to recover their share of Harold’s estate. 
                                                 
3
 The mailing certificate on the petition states that it was mailed on February 28, 2005.  
The Fourth District Court stamped the petition as filed on February 29, 2005, a date that 
does not exist.  For the purposes of this appeal, it does not matter whether it was filed on 
February 28, 2005 or March 1, 2005. 
 
4
 Cited trial exhibits are included in Addendum C. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly awarded Petitioners the Property at issue.  The trial court 
used its broad equitable powers to fashion a remedy for the damages suffered by 
Petitioners.  In order to prevent unjust enrichment, a constructive trust arose by operation 
of law.  The constructive trust was an appropriate remedy and did not need to be pled as a 
cause of action by Petitioners.  Further, Petitioners are legally entitled to the Property by 
operation of Utah’s probate laws.  Thus, the trial court correctly awarded them the 
Property, and this Court should affirm the trial court’s award. 
The trial court correctly found that Ellen had a confidential, fiduciary relationship 
with Petitioners and that she breached her duties to them by changing the terms of her 
trust.  Ellen had a fiduciary relationship with Petitioners as trustee of her trust; Ellen had a 
fiduciary relationship with Petitioners as personal representative of Harold’s estate; and 
Ellen had a confidential relationship with Petitioners by virtue of the contract she entered 
into with them.  Ellen breached her fiduciary, confidential relationship with Petitioners 
when she fraudulently changed the terms of her trust and deprived them of their share of 
their father’s estate.   
Finally, the trial court correctly found that no statute of limitation defense barred 
Petitioners’ recovery.  First, Respondent waived the affirmative defense of statute of 
limitation by failing to assert it in his responsive pleading.  Second, Petitioners filed their 
petition within the statute of limitation, as tolled by the equitable discovery rule. 
However, the trial court erred in failing to award Petitioners their attorneys’ fees as 
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incurred in bringing this action.  The probate code permits personal representatives to 
recover their costs and fees incurred in bringing or defending an action on behalf of the 
estate.  There currently is no personal representative for Harold’s estate.  Petitioners filed 
a motion to have Hal LeFevre appointed as successor personal representative.  Petitioners 
stood in the shoes of a personal representative and brought this action in good faith.  
Further, the probate code permits trial courts to award any party to a probate action costs 
and fees.  In this case, justice requires that Petitioners recoup their attorneys’ fees and 
costs.  But for Ellen’s fraud and Respondent’s deception, Petitioners would not have had 
to bring this costly and protracted action.  Under either statute, Ellen’s estate should be 
required to pay for Petitioners’ attorneys’ fees. 
In addition, the trial court erred in granting Respondent a stay pending appeal.  The 
judgment in this case was self-executing because it, on its face, granted title of the 
Property to Petitioners.  Where, as in this case, a judgment is self-executing, a stay and 
bond are ineffective.  Utah law clearly states that where a judgment is self-executing, an 
appeal cannot stay the force and effect of the judgment.  Petitioners were damaged by the 
trial court’s imposition of an improper stay.  They had all of the responsibilities and 
liabilities of ownership, without the ability to properly protect their interest. 
This Court should therefore affirm the trial court’s decision that Petitioners are the 
owners of the Property.  This Court should reverse the trial court’s failure to award 
Petitioners their attorneys’ fees and to award Respondent a stay pending appeal and 
remand for a determination of attorneys fees’ and damages. 
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ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly awarded the Property to Petitioners and its judgment 
should be affirmed.  This case came before the trial court as an equity proceeding in a 
probate case.  After a two-day bench trial, the trial court found that, based on the facts in 
evidence, a constructive trust arose by law to prevent unjust enrichment.  The trial court’s 
application of the law to the facts is granted some deference in view of the fact that 
questions involving constructive trusts are highly factual questions.  See State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975); In 
re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982). 
Respondent declares that he “is not directly challenging the trial court’s findings” 
of fact.  Brief of Appellant, p. 7 n.38.  However, to the extent Respondent does indirectly 
challenge the trial court’s findings, he “must first marshal all the evidence in support of 
the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings . . . .” Grayson Roper Ltd. P’ship 
v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) (quoted in Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ¶ 
34 n.32, 189 P.3d 51).  Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence and demonstrate 
that they do not support the district court’s findings.  Each of the district court’s findings 
is supported by the evidence. 
Petitioners appeal only the trial’s courts failure to award them their attorneys’ fees 
and improper grant of a stay pending appeal.  Both of these issues involve questions of 
law and are therefore reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the trial court.  
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Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998); Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT 
App 175, ¶ 5, 982 P.2d 586.   Though, in some respects, the issue of the stay pending 
appeal is now moot, this issue should be heard and decided by this court because it is 
“capable of repetition yet evading review.”  In re Johnson, 2001 UT 110, ¶ 15, 48 P.3d 
881. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED PETITIONERS TITLE 
TO THE PROPERTY.  
 
Petitioners are legally entitled to the Property at issue.  First, the trial court 
correctly found that Petitioners were entitled to the Property because a constructive trust 
arose as a matter of law. Second, the trial court correctly found that Petitioners had a 
confidential relationship with Ellen and that she breached her duty to Petitioners when 
she transferred the Property to her children.  Finally, the trial court correctly found that no 
statute of limitation issue barred Petitioners’ recovery.   
A. The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Petitioners Title To The Property. 
 
Petitioners are entitled to the Property at issue.  A trial court has broad 
discretionary powers, particularly in cases of equity, to fashion appropriate remedies.  The 
trial court properly found that a constructive trust arose as a matter of law to remedy the 
unjust enrichment caused by Ellen’s misdeeds.  Further, even if the court incorrectly 
granted Petitioners title to the Property via a constructive trust, Petitioners were legally 
entitled to the Property by operation of probate law. 
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1. The trial court used its broad discretionary powers to do equity 
in this case by finding that a constructive trust arose as a matter 
of law. 
 
The trial court correctly awarded Petitioners the Property via a constructive trust.  
Trial courts have inherent powers to do equity in the cases before them.  For example, 
“[w]here land, or any estate therein, is the subject-matter of the agreement, the 
inadequacy of the legal remedy is well settled, and the equitable jurisdiction is firmly 
established.”  Decorso v. Thomas, 50 P.2d 951, 956 (Utah 1935) (citation omitted).  “The 
regulation and enforcement of trusts is one of the original and inherent powers of a court 
of equity, and with the exception of such as are given to other courts, the jurisdiction of 
equity in all cases of trusts, express or implied, resulting or constructive, is unquestioned, 
especially where matters of account are involved.”  Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added).  “We would turn the doctrine of equitable estoppel upon its head if we were to 
hold that the power to correct an inequity as unjust as the one here, would, without more, 
defeat our courts’ inherent power to seek and to do equity.”  Eldredge v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671, 678 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis added). 
The trial court in this case used its broad equitable powers to do justice in this case 
via the remedy of a constructive trust.  The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that a 
“constructive trust is an equitable remedy.”  Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ¶ 12, 994 P.2d 
193.  A constructive trust is imposed to “prevent one for unjustly profiting through fraud 
or the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary or confidential relationship” and is 
created when “a person acquires the legal title to property of another by means of an 
14 
intentional false or fraudulent verbal promise to hold the same for a certain purpose, and, 
having thus obtained the title, retains and claims the property as his own.”  Hawkins v. 
Perry, 123 Utah 16, 23, 253 P.2d 372, 375 (1953) (citation omitted).  A constructive trust 
is still found when “at the time of the transfer the transferee intended to perform the 
agreement, and even though he was not guilty of undue influence in procuring the 
conveyance.  The abuse of the confidential relation consists merely in the failure of the 
transferee to perform his promise.”  Id. at 376 (citation omitted). 
In Acott v. Tomlinson, the Utah Supreme Court decided a case with facts 
substantially similar to the present case.  337 P.2d 720 (Utah 1959).  Defendant 
Tomlinson, his mother, and his six siblings owned mining shares left to them by their 
father.  Id. at 722.  Tomlinson wrote letters to his mother and six siblings, asking them to 
quitclaim their shares to him.  Id. at 723.  He stated that he would hold the shares for their 
benefit and that he would “account for all money and stock received therefrom.”  Id.  
Tomlinson thereafter claimed all of the property for himself.  Id.  His siblings brought 
suit.  The court found that from the fact “there is ample basis for the determination made 
by the trial court that the defendant agreed to hold the property under an express trust; or 
alternatively, that the transaction was so unfair and lacking in disclosure of material facts 
to plaintiffs to require the imposition of a constructive trust on the property for their 
benefit.”  Id. at 724. 
As in Tomlinson, the evidence presented in this case provide ample basis for the 
trial court’s determination that the transaction was so unfair and lacking in disclosure of 
15 
material facts to Petitioner to require the imposition of a constructive trust on the Property 
for their benefit.  In this case, the trial court used its equitable powers to craft a fair 
remedy.  Though Petitioners did not plead constructive trust as a cause of action, the facts 
giving rise to a constructive trust are pled in their petition.  At trial, the trial court found 
that the facts gave rise to a constructive trust.  Ellen did not own the Property.  (R. at 
1174.)  She acquired title to it by means of a fraudulent verbal promise to Petitioners to 
hold it for them.  Id.  And then she retained title and disposed of it as she wished.  (R. at 
1175-76.)  A constructive trust was needed to prevent Ellen and her children from 
unjustly profiting through fraud and violation of a confidential and fiduciary relationship. 
Petitioners entered into an agreement with Ellen in good faith, and she breached that 
agreement.   
2. Even if the trial court erred in finding a constructive trust, 
Petitioners are legally entitled to the Property by virtue of the 
probate estate. 
 
Petitioners are entitled to their share of their father’s estate.  The trial court 
correctly applied current probate law to this case.  The Utah Uniform Probate Code 
specifically states 
The code applies to any proceeding in court then pending or thereafter 
commenced regardless of the time of the death of decedent except to the extent 
that in the opinion of the court the former procedure should be made applicable 
in a particular case in the interest of justice or because of the infeasibility of 
application of the procedure of this code. 
 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-8-101(2)(b).  The code directs that all cases be decided under the 
current probate law unless any of the exceptions apply.  The trial court found that 
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Respondent did not argue that any of the exceptions applied in this case.  (R. at 1178.)  
Therefore, Respondent cannot argue that the exceptions, and therefore the older versions 
of the probate code, apply on appeal.  Further, this case was still pending when the 
current probate laws were adopted.  Therefore, the above statute indicates that the current 
statutes apply and there is no issue of retroactive application. 
Under the current law, the “intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is the 
first $50,000, plus 1/2 of any balance of the intestate estate, if one or more of the 
decedent’s surviving descendants are not descendants of the surviving spouse.”  Id. § 75-
2-102(1)(b).  All of the nonprobate transfers received by the surviving spouse are 
deducted from her share of the intestate estate.  Id. § 75-2-102(2).  Under 75-2-206, 
nonprobate transfers to the surviving spouse are defined as “all property that passed 
outside probate at the decedent’s death from the decedent to the surviving spouse by 
reason of the decedent’s death.”  Id. § 75-2-206.  After the surviving spouse’s net share of 
the intestate estate is calculated and distributed, the remainder of the estate passes “to the 
decedent’s descendants per capita at each generation as defined in Subsection 75-2-
106(2).”  Id. § 75-2-103(1). 
At trial, Petitioners presented evidence that the assets in Harold’s probate estate 
totaled $211,363.38.5  The debts in the probate estate, including the mortgage on the 
                                                 
5
 Respondent argues that he presented conflicting evidence of the value of Harold’s 
probate estate and nonprobate transfers at trial.  However, the trial court specifically 
found that Respondent was not a credible witness as to any of the issues in the case.  (R. 
at 1177.) 
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Property, totaled $98,200.08, leaving a net probate estate of $113,163.30.  (Trial Exhibit, 
Tab 96.)  Under the surviving spouse statute, Ellen would have been entitled to 
$81,581.65 of the probate estate.  However, that total is offset by any nonprobate transfers 
Ellen received as a result of Harold’s death.  The nonprobate transfers to Ellen totaled 
$181,324.25.6  (Trial Exhibit, Tab 97.)  The evidence therefore showed that Ellen 
therefore received more than the surviving spouse’s share and the entire probate estate of 
$113,163.30 should have been distributed to Petitioners.7  Since the Property was 
included in the probate estate, Petitioners are entitled to the Property either by operation 
of a constructive trust as a result of Ellen’s fraud or by operation of the probate statutes. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Found That Petitioners Had A Confidential 
or Fiduciary Relationship With Ellen LeFevre, Which She Breached. 
 
Ellen LeFevre, by her actions, created confidential and fiduciary relationships with 
Petitioners.  Under Utah law, a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists in a variety of 
circumstances.  The “personal representative of a decedent . . . stands in a fiduciary 
relationship to the creditors and heirs of the deceased.”  Overturf v. Univ. of Utah Med. 
Ctr., 1999 UT 3, ¶ 11, 973 P.2d 413.  A trustee owes “fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries 
of the trust.”  Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 918 
                                                 
6
 Thus, even if, as Respondent argues, Ellen is credited for the entire $64,144.22 
mortgage that was marital debt and therefore half hers, Ellen still received a net of 
$117,180.03.  That amount is $35,598.38 more than she was entitled to under the 
surviving spouse statute. 
 
7
 Because Harold’s estate is still before the trial court, the trial court had the authority to 
directly transfer the Property to Petitioners.  The court did not, as Respondent argues, 
need to place the Property back in the probate estate prior to awarding it to Petitioners. 
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(Utah 1993).  And a “fiduciary or confidential relationship may be created by contract . . . 
.”  Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 90 n.5 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Hal Taylor 
Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1982)). 
In this case, the evidence showed that Ellen had a confidential and fiduciary 
relationship with Petitioners by virtue of three different positions.  First, Ellen owed 
Petitioners fiduciary duties because of her status as the personal representative of their 
father’s estate and their status as heirs of the estate.  (R. at 1175.)  Second, Ellen owed 
Petitioners fiduciary duties because of her status as the trustee of her trust and their status 
as beneficiaries of that trust.  (R. at 1174-75.)  Finally, Ellen had a confidential 
relationship with Petitioners by virtue of the contract she made with them with respect to 
the Property.  (R. at 1174.) 
The trial court correctly found that Ellen LeFevre “abused [her] confidential, 
fiduciary relationship with the LeFevre children when she (and the Stout children) 
changed the material terms and conditions of the agreement.”  (R. at 1174.)  A trustee 
owes a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries, which requires her “to act only for the benefit 
of the beneficiaries and to exercise prudence and skill in administering the trust.”  Nat’l 
Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 869 P.2d at 918.  Ellen was the personal representative of 
the Decedent’s estate and the trustee of the trust created from her agreement with 
Petitioners.  As the personal representative, Ellen had the duty to distribute the decedent’s 
estate according to the probate code.  As the trustee, Ellen had the duty to distribute the 
Property in the trust according to her agreement with Petitioners.  However, the evidence 
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showed that Ellen breached her contract with Petitioners as well as her duties to them as 
personal representative and as trustee when she fraudulently changed the terms of her 
trust to exclude Petitioners. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Found That Petitioners’ Petition Was Not 
Barred By A Statute Of Limitation Issue. 
 
No statute of limitation issue bars Petitioners’ right to recovery in this case.  First, 
Respondent waived the defense of a lapsed statute of limitation when he failed to assert it 
in his objection to Petitioners’ petition.  Second, even if Respondent did not waive the 
defense, Petitioners filed their petition well within the applicable statute of limitation. 
1. Respondent waived his right to assert the affirmative defense of 
a lapsed statute of limitation by failing to assert it in his 
responsive pleading. 
 
Because Respondent failed to assert a statute of limitations defense in his 
Objection to Petitioners’ Petition to Set Aside Personal Representative Transfers from 
Decedent’s Estate, he waived the right to assert the defense.  Under Utah law, a “party 
waives a statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it in a responsive pleading or by 
motion before submitting a responsive filing.”  Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, 
959 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1998); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h).  In this case, Petitioners filed a 
Petition to Set Aside Personal Representative Transfers from Decedent’s Estate.  (R. at 
28-29.) Respondent filed his responsive pleading in the form of an objection to the 
petition.  (R. at 76-91.)  In his objection, Respondent makes no mention of a statute of 
limitations defense.  Id.  He therefore waived the defense and cannot properly assert the 
defense on appeal. 
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2. Even if Respondent did not waive his right to assert a statute of 
limitations defense, Petitioners filed their petition within the 
applicable statute of limitation. 
 
Petitioners filed their petition within the applicable statute of limitation.  The 
following statute of limitation applies to Petitioners’ action:  
“An action may be brought within four years: (1) after the last charge is made 
or the last payment is received: (a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not 
founded upon an instrument in writing.”   
 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-307(1)(a). 
 
The general rule regarding statutes of limitations is that they start running “upon 
the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.”  Russell 
Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 20, 108 P.3d 741 (citation omitted).  
However, the equitable discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations “until the discovery 
of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.”  Id. at ¶ 21 (citation omitted).  “The 
applicability of a statute of limitations and the applicability of the discovery rule are 
questions of law, which [are] review[ed] for correctness.” Id. at ¶ 18 (quoting Spears v. 
Warr, 2002 UT 24, ¶ 32, 44 P.3d 742). 
The equitable discovery rule will toll a statute of limitations if either (1) “a 
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the defendant’s 
concealment or misleading conduct” or (2) “the case presents exceptional circumstances 
and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any 
showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.”  Id. at ¶ 
25 (citation omitted). 
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Under the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule, the plaintiff must 
first make a prima facie case showing that the defendant committed fraudulent 
concealment.  Charlesworth v. Reyns, 2005 UT App 214, ¶ 25, 113 P.3d 1031.  
Fraudulent concealment requires that a person with “a legal duty or obligation to 
communicate certain facts remain[s] silent or otherwise act[s] to conceal material facts 
known to him.”  Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 (Utah 1997).  Utah courts 
find fraudulent concealment when a fiduciary breaches his or her duty to “speak the 
truth.”  Charlesworth, 2005 UT App 214, ¶ 26 (“A fiduciary’s breach of the ‘duty to 
speak the truth’ is sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment.”) (citations omitted).  
The plaintiff must then show that “‘(1) they neither knew nor reasonably should have 
known of the facts underlying their causes of action before the . . . limitations period 
expired; or (2) notwithstanding their actual or constructive knowledge of the facts 
underlying their causes of action within the limitations period, Plaintiffs acted reasonably’ 
by delaying the filing of a complaint until after the expiration of the limitations period.”  
Id. at ¶ 25 (citation omitted).  The policy behind this rule was discussed by the Utah 
Supreme Court: 
If we were to look only to whether a plaintiff theoretically could have brought 
a suit before the limitations period expired without looking to the relative 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of that action under the circumstances, we 
would reward a defendant's fraudulent and deceptive misbehavior by depriving 
an innocent plaintiff of a reasonable period within which to act.   This we 
refuse to do.  “[T]o permit one practicing a fraud and then concealing it to 
plead the statute of limitations when, in fact, the injured party did not know of 
and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the fraud” would be 
“not only subversive of good morals, but also contrary to the plainest 
principles of justice.” 
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Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, ¶ 28 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).  Inquiry or 
constructive notice is found “only at that point at which a plaintiff, reasonably on notice 
to inquire into a defendant’s wrongdoing, would have . . . discovered the facts . . . despite 
the defendant’s efforts to conceal [them].”  Charlesworth, 2005 UT App 214, ¶ 29.   
 The determination of whether a plaintiff would reasonably discover facts is a 
“highly fact-dependent legal question.”  Id. at ¶ 30 (citation omitted).  Therefore, the legal 
question of whether a statute of limitation has been tolled is also a fact question, and the 
fact finder should be given some deference in its determination.  See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
 Under the exceptional circumstances version of the equitable discovery rule, the 
court uses a balancing test and weighs “the hardship imposed on the claimants by the 
application of the statue of limitations against any prejudice to the defendant resulting 
from the passage of time.”  Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, ¶ 11, 998 P.2d 262.  However, 
this balancing test has already been conducted in “cases involving beneficiaries’ claims of 
trustee misconduct.” Id.  In Snow, the court held that because of the “close familial 
relationship involved” and because “the beneficiary will be less likely to question the 
motives of the trustee and [is] less likely to sue.” the discovery rule needs to be applied to 
prevent unjust results.  Id.  Consequently, the discovery rule is applied to “protect the 
interests of a beneficiary” until “the beneficiary knows or should know of the alleged 
breach of repudiation.”  Id.  In other words, when a case “involves a trust, a trustee cannot 
take advantage of a statute of limitations defense until something has occurred to give the 
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beneficiary a ‘clear indication’ that a breach or repudiation has occurred . . . .”  Id.  
(quoting Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 58, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965); Acott v. 
Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 76-77, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 1959)).  Therefore, in cases 
involving a trust, the statute of limitations will not start running “until the beneficiary 
knows or through reasonable investigation could have learned of a breach or repudiation.” 
 Id. 
 Under either version of the equitable discovery rule, the statute of limitation was 
tolled in this case until weeks after Ellen’s death.  Under the concealment version, 
Petitioners’ evidence established a prima facie case that Ellen committed fraudulent 
concealment when she failed to “speak the truth” regarding her changes to the trust.  In 
fact, the trial court specifically found that Petitioners were never notified of these 
amendments or given copies of the trust documents.  (R. at 1175-76.)  Petitioners also 
demonstrated that they neither knew nor should have known of the facts underlying their 
cause of action until after Ellen’s death.  Their agreement with Ellen was that she could 
live on the Property until her death, at which time the Property would be transferred to 
them.  Thus, as the trial court found, until Petitioners learned of her death and her failure 
to maintain the trust as agreed, they had no reason to question their stepmother.  (R. at 
1177-78.) 
 Under the exceptional circumstances version of the equitable discovery rule, Utah 
courts have already determined that the discovery rule should be applied in “cases 
involving beneficiaries’ claims of trustee misconduct” because of the “close familial 
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relationship involved.”  Thus, under the balancing test, the equities weigh in favor of the 
discovery rule applying to Petitioners. 
 Evidence at trial showed that Petitioners did not discover the facts underlying their 
claims against Ellen until weeks after her death.  Ellen died on October 28, 2004.  Weeks 
later, Petitioners learned of her death and contacted her attorney to inquire about the 
estate.  (R. at 1177-78.)  When they discovered that the trust terms had been modified to 
exclude them, they immediately filed their petition on February 28, 2005, well within the 
applicable four-year statute of limitation. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD PETITIONERS 
THEIR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AS INCURRED IN THIS MATTER.   
 
Petitioners should have been awarded their attorneys fees.  Petitioners are entitled 
to recoup their attorneys’ fees under two statutes found in the Probate Code: 
“When not otherwise prescribed in this code, the court, or the Supreme 
Court on appeal from the court, may, in its discretion, order costs to be paid 
by any party to the proceedings or out of the assets of the estate as justice 
may require.”   
 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-310 (2009). 
 
“If any . . . person nominated as personal representative defends or 
prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he is 
entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and 
disbursements, including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred.”   
 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 (2009).  Petitioners should be awarded their attorneys’ fees 
as incurred in this matter under both sections 75-3-719 and 75-1-310.   
Under section 75-1-310, justice requires that Petitioners be awarded their 
attorneys’ fees as incurred in this matter.  The trial court found that Ellen breached her 
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fiduciary duties to Petitioners and defrauded them.  But for her fraud and Respondent’s 
deception, Petitioners would not have been forced to bring this suit, which has been 
protracted and costly, to reverse that fraud.  Ellen and her children should not be allowed 
to perpetrate such hardship on Petitioners.  The trial court erred in failing to find that 
justice requires that Petitioners be awarded their attorneys’ fees. 
Under section 75-3-719, Petitioners should be reimbursed by the estate for having 
to bring this action.  Ellen was the personal representative of Harold’s estate until her 
death in 2004.  See Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-609 (2009).  Since that time, no successor 
personal representative has been appointed.  Petitioners made a motion to have Hal 
LeFevre designated.  Though not officially designated, Petitioners stood in the place of a 
personal representative and brought this suit in good faith on behalf of the estate.  
Petitioners should therefore be awarded from the estate his necessary expenses and 
disbursements, including reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred.  Since Harold’s estate is still 
open and subject to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the trial court should have awarded 
Petitioner his attorneys’ fees and costs. 
Further, because Petitioners were entitled to their attorneys’ fees and costs in the 
trial court, they should also be awarded their attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal.  See 
Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, 181 P.3d 791. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT’S REQUEST 
FOR A STAY PENDING APPEAL. 
 
Respondent was not entitled to a stay pending appeal. Though, in some respects, 
the issue of the stay pending appeal is now moot, this issue should be heard and decided 
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by this court because it is “capable of repetition yet evading review.”  In re Johnson, 2001 
UT 110, ¶ 15, 48 P.3d 881.  The question of the appropriateness of a stay pending appeal 
is always going to be moot on appeal.  This Court should therefore decide the issue to 
prevent future incorrect application of stay law. 
Though an appellant generally has the option of giving a supersedeas bond and 
obtaining a stay pending appeal, a stay and accompanying supersedeas bond is ineffective 
and procedurally unnecessary where, as in this case, the judgment was self-executing.  
See Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d).  This idea has long been held in Utah law.  The Utah Supreme 
Court held early on that “where . . . the judgment is self-executing, and no act of a 
ministerial officer is necessary to make it effective, an appeal does not suspend or 
otherwise stay the force and effect of the judgment.”  In re Grant, 44 Utah 386, 390, 140 
P.2d 226, 228 (1914).  In fact, the court held that “as a self executing judgment requires 
no proceeding for its enforcement, there is nothing upon which a stay bond can operate in 
the case of such a judgment.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 Further, the public policy behind stays pending appeal and supersedeas bonds does 
not apply to the self-executing judgment in this case.  The “purpose and effect of 
supersedeas is to restrain the successful party and the lower court from taking affirmative 
action to enforce a judgment or decree.”  Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 
1244, 1248 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added).  In fact, a supersedeas bond “operates against 
the enforcement of the judgment and not against the judgment itself.”  Gumberts v. East 
Oak Street Hotel Co., 88 N.E.2d 883, 885 (Ill. 1949) (emphasis added) (cited in Mills, 
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590 P.2d at 1248 n.12).  
 In this case, the judgment is self-executing, in that it requires no proceeding or 
action to be taken for its enforcement; the judgment is executed by its own terms.  By 
virtue of the judgment, Petitioners have title to the Property at issue.  Thus, there is 
nothing upon which a stay bond can operate. 
 The inappropriateness of a supersedeas bond in a case such as this is illustrated by 
the fact that Petitioners cannot find and Respondent has not cited any authority for the 
appropriate amount of a supersedeas bond in such a case.  (R. 1193-1201.)  Rule 62(j) 
states that “a court shall set the supersedeas bond in an amount that adequately protects 
the judgment creditor against loss or damage occasioned by the appeal and assures 
payment in the event the judgment is affirmed.”  Utah R. Civ. P. 62(j).  Thus, the purpose 
of the supersedeas bond is reaffirmed by the rule to be the protection of the party who 
won the judgment in the first place.  The purpose is not to protect the interests of the 
judgment debtor should he perhaps obtain a reversal.  In light of such a purpose, a 
supersedeas bond was prohibited by the rules in this case because the judgment is self-
executing. 
 Petitioners have been damaged by the entry of the stay.  They have all of the 
responsibilities and liabilities of homeowners without the power to protect their interest.  
With use and direction of the Property out of their hands, they have been prevented from 
selling the home prior to the crash of the real estate market.  They are unable to rent and 
maintain the home.  They are unable to control the repair and condition of the home.   
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They are incurring tax liabilities and liabilities for violations of Provo City ordinances.  In 
short, Petitioners have been wrongfully deprived of their ability to protect their interest in 
the home.  Because the trial court erroneously granted Respondent a stay pending appeal, 
Petitioners should be awarded damages incurred as a result, including but not limited to 
the rental value of the Property since the stay entered, the costs of repairing the home, 
unpaid taxes, and any assessments or fees levied by Provo City because of the condition 
of the Property. 
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CONCLUSION 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial court’s 
decision that Petitioners are the rightful owners of the Property.  This Court should 
reverse the trial court’s failure to award Petitioners their attorneys’ fees and remand for a 
determination of attorneys’ fees in the trial court and on appeal.  This Court should also 
reverse the trial court’s improper stay pending appeal and remand for a determination of 
damages. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23d day of January 2009. 
 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
Stephen Quesenberry 
Attorneys for Petitioners/Appellees 
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I hereby certify that, on the 23d day of January 2009, two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS were hand-
delivered to the following: 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH (3752) 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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